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TERRY L. ANDERSON AND PETER J. HILL:
BIRTH OF A TRANSFER SOCIETY
STUDY GUIDE, 2014
Steven Alan Samson
CHAPTER ONE: GAMES PEOPLE PLAY
Outline
A.

DETERMINING THE PROPER EXTENT OF FREEDOM (1-4)
1.
Premise: An Individual Attempts to Maximize His Own Well-Being
a.
Collective choices concerning the proper extend of freedom
b.
A taxonomy for making this choice
c.
The authors begin with a series of scenarios
2.
Wheat Farmer, 1840
3.
Pit Bull Trainer, 1870
4.
Railroad Executive, 1892
5.
Painters Union Secretary, 1954
6.
Tax Lawyer, 1975
7.
Categorization of Actions as Either Productive or Transfer Activities
a.
“Productive activity adds not only to the persona; wealth of individuals but also
to the total wealth of the society”
b.
“Transfer activities add to the wealth of specific individuals or groups of
individuals but reduce the wealth of other individuals or groups in the society.”
8.
Measuring the Net Change in Social Output
a.
Positive-sum vs. negative-sum games [a positive-sum game increases total
wealth; a negative sum game decreases total wealth; a zero-sum game simply
redistributes it and is also unproductive]
9.
Early American Experience: Limited Transfer Activity
a.
The Constitution severely constrained transfers
b.
[Two notable exceptions: slavery and tariffs]
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CHAPTER TWO: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Outline
A.

LIKELY CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY DOMINATES TRANSFER
ACTIVITY (4)
1.
Methodology: The Individual Is the Unit of Analysis [Methodological Individualism]
2.
James Buchanan [a Nobel Laureate]: This Suggests a Criterion for “Betterness”
a.
A situation is judged “good” to the extent it allows individuals to get what they
want
1)
It is limited only by the principle of mutual agreement
3.
Positive-Sum Games: Two Senses of the Term
a.
Increased output

B.

C.

D.

b.
Increased value
PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY (4-6)
1.
Individual Comparison of Marginal Benefits with Marginal Costs
[Marginal utility or benefit is “the additional satisfaction or utility that a person receives
from consuming an additional unit of a good or service. Marginal cost in the cost of
producing a single unit of a good or the additional cost for producing an additional
unit. Variables that either reduce or raise the cost include economies of scale, as in
mass production; information asymmetries, where one party has more or better
information than another; the presence of negative or positive externalities (benefits or
costs that are not reflected in the price); transaction costs; price discrimination; etc.]
2.
An Individual Participates in a Voluntary Trade with the Expectation That It Is a PositiveSum Game
3.
What about the Larger Society?
a.
Standard view: Voluntary trades are positive sum for society as long as there are
no externalities [such as pollution, criminal activity, social blight, etc.]
[Consequently, some people wish to entrust regulatory power to an impartial or
omniscient third party]
b.
Alternative View: Accountability of the actors for their actions
1)
Responsibility is determined by ownership [liability]
4.
Ownership Must Be Exclusive
a.
For it to be exclusive, it must be well-defined, enforced, and transferable
1)
Violation of any of these conditions generates inefficiency
[cf. Garrett Hardin on “the tragedy of the commons,” where no one “takes
ownership” over property that is common to all]
b.
Consequences of non-exclusivity of ownership
1)
Either loss of productivity or overproduction
c.
The rights structure must be an efficient one
1)
Individuals do good by doing well
TRANSFER ACTIVITY (6-7)
1.
Alternative Routes to Wealth Maximization
a.
Problems are created when property rights are not well-defined and enforced
1)
Wealth is determined in part by the ability of decision-makers to move
inputs and outputs to higher-valued alternatives
2)
Wealth is also determined by who holds the exclusive property rights;
thus, a decision maker may choose to devote resources and effort to
obtaining these rights
2.
Non-Voluntary Transfers
a.
Theft: A negative-sum game
1)
This is one reason the authors are unwilling to allow interpersonal utility
comparisons on page 4
b.
Deficiency of traditional analysis: It treats theft as a zero-sum game rather than
a negative-sum game
1)
It ignores the consumption of additional resources [at the very least, it
involves transaction costs, which would be very evident if the same thing
were stolen repeatedly]
2)
Result: Net social waste
3.
The Coercive Power of Government Is Employed to Help Define and Enforce Private
Rights
a.
Rules against transfers can promote positive-sum games
4.
The Coercive Power of Government Also Opens Another Arena for Transfer Activity
[e.g., legal plunder and rent-seeking operations that control entry into a market]
a.
Legal processes that produce redefinition and redistribution reduce society’s
maximum capacity by diverting resources
5.
Dilemma
a.
Given the costs either way, would it be better not to regulate transfers?
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRACT (7-10)

1.

E.

The Basic Constitutional Contract Offers a Way for Reducing Such Resource Waste
a.
It makes rules protecting basic rights more difficult to change
1)
This makes transfers less likely to occur
2.
Working Definition of a Constitutional Contract
a.
Two specifications: Basic rights and the means of enforcing them
b.
Goal: A protective state
1)
The individual surrenders some freedom of action for a mechanism that
secures rights
2)
The state may claim only those resources needed for this purpose
c.
Coercion may be necessary because of the potential free-rider problem [an
unpaid benefit, which is an example of a negative externality]
3.
Reasons Why a State May Not Choose to Prohibit All Transfers: The “Legitimacy Issue”
and the “Public Goods” Problem
4.
Legitimacy Issue
a.
A redistribution of rights may be necessary where they were obtained through
transfers [This might include various types of restitution or reparation, as may be
seen in Mosaic law]
5.
Public Goods Problem
a.
Cost of excluding nonparticipants [free-riders] from the benefits of an exchange
may result in underproduction
6.
Incentive to Conceal True Preferences for Public Goods Also Results in Underproduction
a.
Collective action provides a means of optimizing public goods production
b.
Ground rules must be specified
7.
But Such Exceptions May Lead to a Society Dominated by Transfer Activity
a.
How can government establish legitimate boundaries of self-interest?
8.
What Is to Prevent People from Arguing for a Transfer Based on Their Own Standard of
Legitimacy?
a.
19C railroads gained the rights to profits but were also able to restrict competition
[plus they were subsidized, enjoyed limited liability protection, retained control of
rights-of-way for decades after the tracks were laid, and were taken over by the
federal government during and following the First World War]
b.
Much transfer activity occurs because of attempts to resolve legitimacy issues
through taxation [the tax code reflects public policy priorities]
1)
Incentive for gaining wealth through nonproductive means
9.
Problem of Accurately Defining and Then Providing Public Goods through Non-voluntary
Transfer
a.
Need to specify and limit the definition
b.
Otherwise, negative-sum games result
THE MIX OF PRODUCTIVE AND TRANSFER ACTIVITY (10-12)
1.
Reasons for the Existence of Transfer Activity within a Constitutional Contract
a.
These reasons do not explain fluctuations in the mix of productive and transfer
activity
b.
Two additional factors
2.
Demand Side: Potential Method of Increasing Personal Wealth
a.
Minimal protective state results in dynamic economy that increases aggregate
wealth
b.
Douglass North on the destabilizing consequences of such an economy [what
Joseph Schumpeter called “creative destruction”]
c.
The absolute wealth position of some and the relative wealth position of others
may decline
d.
There is an incentive to recover such (perceived) losses through transfer activity
3.
Supply Side: Bill of Rights Freedoms
a.
Relatively unambiguous rights, such as free speech, are hard to redefine [but not
impossible]
4.
Ambiguity Can Favor Transfer Activity Based on [Re]Interpretation
a.
Ideology and social attitudes

b.

5.

Transfer activity is more likely to prevail if all rights are held at the mercy of the
state
c.
These changes are part of the exogenous forces that have given birth to the
transfer society
Historical Setting
a.
America’s historical experience
b.
Today’s transfer society
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